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COMMENT
MINERAL RIGHTS: THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT
AMONG CO-OWNERS
The Louisiana Mineral Code expressly requires that one who acquires
a mineral servitude or lease from a co-owner of land must obtain the
consent of "co-owners owning at least an undivided ninety percent
interest" in the land in order to validly exercise the right.' This consent
is required because the development of mineral interests constitutes a
change in the destination of the land and would thereby infringe on
the rights of a co-owner who did not consent and who wished to maintain
the land in its current status.
2
Co-ownership exists when there is a thing owned jointly in its
entirety. Roman law recognized the concept of co-ownership as each
co-owner "possessing an abstract portion of the whole," or a portion
of "each molecule" of the property held in common.3 Unanimous con-
sent was required between co-owners in order to modify the substance
or change the destination of the thing. Any co-owner had the right to
prevent an action to change the thing held in common. Thus, the one
opposing a change had a greater right vis-a-vis the other co-owners,
even though he may have been in the minority.4
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Article 164 of the Mineral Code provides that
[a] co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude out of his undivided interest
in the land, and prescription commences from the date of its creation. One
who acquires a mineral servitude from a co-owner of land may not exercise his
right without the consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided ninety
percent interest in the land. A co-owner of the land who does not consent to
the exercise of such rights has no liability for the costs of development and
operations, except out of his share of production.
La. R.S. 31:164 (Supp. 1987).
Article 166 provides that
[a] co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral lease as to his undivided interest
in the land but the lessee may not exercise his rights thereunder without consent
of co-owners owning at least an undivided ninety percent interest in the land.
A co-owner of the land who does not consent to the exercise of such rights
has no liability for the costs of development and operations or other costs,
except out of his share of production.
La. R.S. 31:166 (Supp. 1987). See also infra note 21 and accompanying text.
2. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919).
3. Comment, Ownership in Indivision in Louisiana, 22 Tul. L. Rev. 611 (1948).
4. Carroll, 145 La. at 303, 82 So. at 278-79.
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French doctrine recognized co-ownership in the same manner as did
Roman law. Aubry and Rau stated that
when there is indivision between several persons, each one of them
possesses on the thing, in so far as concerns his or her share,
all the rights compatible with the purely intellectual nature of this
quota, and may exercise them unaided; on the other hand, no
single one of these persons can confer rights on the entirety of
the common property, or even on any specific part, without the
consent of all the others.'
A co-owner thus may use the whole property for himself. By doing so,
however, he may not interfere with the other co-owner's rights. One
co-owner may prevent any change, no matter how advantageous and
no matter how much the other co-owners desire it, as it is a co-owner's
right to maintain the thing in its current condition.
This comment explores the concepts of co-ownership and consent
among co-owners of mineral interests. It discusses what the consent
entails, the effects on the consenting and nonconsenting co-owners, and
suggests solutions to the problems encountered as a result of the re-
quirement of consent.
LOUISIANA PRINCIPLES OF CO-OWNERSHIP
Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code, 6 the Louisiana
Civil Code governed all matters pertaining to mineral rights. The
Civil Code provides that "[t]wo or more persons may own the same
thing in indivision, each having an undivided share."' In accordance
with Roman doctrine, the Civil Code also requires that consent of all
co-owners is necessary to establish a predial servitude on an estate owned
in indivision. s Likewise, under the mineral code a mineral servitude can
be exercised only with the consent of the co-owners of the land.9
The Louisiana Supreme Court held in Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll°
that a co-owner of land cannot exploit the land for minerals without
the consent of his co-owner, and he cannot confer such a right on his
5. Id. at 303, 82 So. at 279, quoting Aubry and Rau, vol. 2, para. 221, pp. 404-
05.
6. The Louisiana Mineral Code was enacted as Title 31 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes, Chapters 1 through 13, by 1974 La. Act No. 50. Co-ownership is governed by
articles 164-187.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 480.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 714 provides that "[a] predial servitude on an estate owned
in indivision may be established only with the consent of all the co-owners. When a co-
owner purports to establish a servitude on the entire estate, the contract is not null; but,
it's execution is suspended until the consent of all coowners is obtained."
9. La. R.S. 31:164 (Supp. 1987).
10. 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919).
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lessee. Gulf Refining had sought enforcement of a lease granted by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owner. The court held
that one co-owner can prevent another co-owner from undertaking min-
eral operations on the jointly owned property, as such use would con-
stitute a change in its destination."1
The mineral code provides for co-ownership of mineral rights. 12
Deviating slightly from the civilian tradition, the mineral code requires
consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided ninety percent interest
in the land or mineral interest in order to conduct mineral operations
on the land. 3 This requirement of consent is in direct conflict with
most common law states. These states allow any co-owner of land or
minerals to conduct mineral operations subject only to the duty to
account to the other co-owners for their share of the profits, 4 and to
account to holders of future interests, if any, for waste of the estate.',5
Thus, in other states, a minority owner is allowed to exploit the land
for minerals despite the opposition of the majority.
THE REQUIRED CONSENT
It is clear that Louisiana law requires consent to conduct mineral
operations on co-owned land or on co-owned mineral interests. A mineral
servitude owner, however, is not required to obtain consent from the
owner of the land subject to the servitude before developing minerals, 6
11. "Co-owners are owners par mi et par tout, of part and of the whole. Neither
of two co-owners has the exclusive right to any determinate part of the common property."
Id. at 302, 82 So. at 278; see also Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359,
196 So. 558 (1940), and Sun Oil Co. v. St. Mineral Bd., 231 La. 689, 92 So. 2d 583
(1056), dismissed, 353 U.S. 962, 77 S. Ct. 1048, reh'g denied, 354 U.S. 943, 77 S. Ct.
1395 (1957).
12. Article 168 provides that "[m]ineral rights are susceptible of ownership in indi-
vision." La. R.S. 31:168 (1975).
13. La. R.S. 31:164 and 166 (Supp. 1987). As originally enacted, these articles required
unanimous consent among co-owners. By legislation enacted in 1986, the required consent
was reduced to ninety percent interest.
14. For a good discussion of the common law view, see Pico v. Columbet, 12 Cal.
414 (1859).
15. Waste is defined as any permanent injury, loss of value, change of identity or
destination, or loss of evidence of title by the tenant, and to the detriment'of the future
estate. This has been construed to mean that a tenant may continue to exploit open
mines, but may not open new mines. See I Rest. Property, § 144 and Burby, Real
Property, at 38-39 (1965). This result is consistent with the Louisiana Mineral Code. See
La. R.S. 31:190, 191 (1975).
16. Article 169 provides that "[c]o-ownership does not exist between the owner of
a mineral right and the owner of the land subject to the right or between the owners of
separate mineral rights." La. R.S. 31:169 (1975). See also Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d
869 (La. 1982); Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950); and
Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931).
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for the right to develop is inherent in the very nature of the grant.
Article 169 of the mineral code provides that co-ownership does not
exist between the owner of land and the owner of a mineral right in
the land; each has a separate right and is free to exercise this right at
any time. Nor is consent required of the owners of fractional mineral
servitudes; 17 each owns a separate and distinct right and is free to conduct
operations without the knowledge or approval of other fractional interest
owners. "8
As originally enacted, the mineral code required unanimous consent
of co-owners. Legislation in 1986 amended this to allow operations with
consent of co-owners owning ninety percent interest, thus allowing op-
erations despite the disapproval of those owning a small interest.1 9 The
governor vetoed legislation passed in 1987 to further reduce the required
consent to seventy-five percent.2 0
A. Effect of Granting Rights Without Consent
A co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral servitude or lease,
but the right cannot be exercised without obtaining the requisite consent
of ninety percent of all the interest owned in common." A valid contract
exists between the parties, and the grantor cannot repudiate the contract
for lack of his co-owners' consent. The exercise of the mineral right
granted, however, will be suspended until ninety percent consent can be
obtained. Nonetheless, prescription of the servitude or term of the lease
continues to run from the time the right is granted.
This appears to confirm the rule of Superior Oil Producing Co. v.
Leckelt, 22 where the court held that a co-owner/lessor was estopped from
17. There is a fine distinction between co-owners of a mineral right and fractional
mineral interest owners. Article 69 explains the difference as follows:
The conveyance or reservation by a mineral servitude owner of a portion of
his rights does not divide the mineral servitude but creates only a co-ownership,
except that if a person other than the servitude owner acquires all of the rights
granted by the act creating the servitude in a specific geographic area, the
servitude is divided.
La. R.S. 31:69 (1975). The division of the servitude creates a fractional mineral interest.
18. Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (La. 1950).
19. 1986 La. Acts No. 1047, enacting La. R.S. 31:164, 166 and 175.
20. H.R. 1154, La. Reg. Sess. (1987), introduced by Messrs. Fernandez, Jenkins, and
Sour, to amend and re-enact La. R.S. 31:164, 166 and 175.
21. The mineral code specifies that the consent given is based on the percentage of
interest owned, and not on the number of co-owners. Thus, nine out of ten co-owners,
who together own 5001o of the interest, could not grant a servitude or lease validly
exerciseable by the grantee even though they represent 90% of the owners; the one co-
owner holding the other 50% interest must acquiesce. La. R.S. 31:164 and 166 (Supp.
1987). See supra note 1.
22. 189 La. 972, 181 So. 462 (1938).
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preventing his lessee from exercising the servitude, as this would be
contrary to his own contract. Thus, a lessor cannot prevent the lessee
from acting by objecting that the other co-owners did not consent.
Furthermore, the mineral code recognizes the binding effect of the
contract as between the parties. 3
B. Form of the Consent
The mineral code does not provide the form by which consent is
to be given; however, the jurisprudence has recognized tacit consent as
sufficient. In Superior Oil, one co-owner granted a lease of his one-
fifth share in the minerals to a grantee who in turn subleased his interest.
The court found that the other co-owners had acquiesced in the payment
of royalties to the grantee, since they were aware of these payments
for a continued period of time and had not objected. Such acquiescence
was tantamount to valid consent, and objections as to lack of consent
could not later be raised. Therefore, consent can be given orally or
inferred from the actions of a co-owner.
THE TERM AND EXTENT OF CONSENT
The mineral code addresses neither the effective term nor the nature
and extent of the consent. One writer has suggested that once consent
is given to conduct mineral operations it should be deemed a change
in the destination of the property. 24 Thereafter, new consent for further
mineral development would not be required at any time in the future.
In essence, the consent would be to a change in the destination of the
land. Unanimous or perhaps ninety percent consent of the co-owners
would then be required to prevent any mineral operations in the future.
Construed in this light, consent would be given to the general activity
of mineral development, rather than to a particular lease or servitude.
Read literally, however, the mineral code does not seem to endorse
this view. Articles 164 and 166 appear to require a particular lessee or
servitude owner to obtain consent of the requisite co-owners rather than
to allow him to take advantage of a prior consent given to other
grantees. 25 This means that the consent given for the mineral operation
23. La. R.S. 31:164 (Supp. 1987), official comments.
24. Harrell, Problems Created by Co-ownership in Louisiana, 32 Min. L. Inst. 379,
428 (1985).
25. Article 164, in pertinent part provides, "[olne who acquires a mineral servitude
from a co-owner of land may not exercise his right without the consent of co-owners
owning at least an undivided ninety percent interest in the land." La. R.S. 31:164 (Supp.
1987). Article 166, in pertinent part provides, "[a] co-owner of land may grant a valid
mineral lease as to his undivided interest in the land but the lessee may not exercise his
rights thereunder without consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided ninety percent
interest in the land." La. R.S. 31:166 (Supp. 1987). For full text of these articles, see
supra note 1. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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is directed to the particular lease or servitude granted by a co-owner,
and it expires with the term of the lease or with the prescriptive period
of the servitude. Viewed this way, however, the rules may lead to
problems for a co-owner who seeks to exercise the mineral rights he
holds.
For example, if A and B are co-owners and A grants a servitude
on his undivided one-half interest, clearly the servitude owner must
obtain B's consent before he can conduct operations on the land. If
A's consent is strictly personal to his particular grantee, A still could
object to operations conducted by his co-owner, even though A has
previously given his consent to utilize the land for mineral development.
Furthermore, if A's consent is deemed to be personal, and if B also
granted a servitude on his one-half to another grantee, each co-owner
would be allowed to object to the other's grantee. There would be two
grantees holding rights from each of the co-owners, each prevented from
acting because each co-owner did not extend his consent to each grantee.
If the two grantees joined together to exploit the land, however, it
would appear that neither co-owner could object, since to do so would
prevent his own grantee from exercising the very right which he ex-
tended. 6
The characterization of the nature of consent as personal thus leads
to absurd and unfair results. It allows some grantees to operate, while
disallowing the right to others, based on agreements between the grantees
rather than on the consent granted by the co-owners. In other words,
if the grantees can agree on development between themselves, they can
proceed over the objection of a dissenting co-owner. If, however, they
are unable to agree, they will both be denied their right of development
even though all co-owners have consented, albeit to different grantees.
The law requires consent of the co-owner, not agreement between grant-
ees.
It may be that there exists a middle ground where the consent given
is neither strictly personal, extending only to the particular grantee, nor
general, extending to activity by anyone who obtains the right. It can
be argued that if A grants a servitude to X, he is giving consent to
mineral development, but only to the extent of the right he has created.
26. A's grantee could not object to activities of B, the other co-owner from whom
he did not receive any right. A grantee has only the rights which he was given and no
other rights. Granting a non-exclusive right to explore does not imply a grant of the right
to object to exploration by others. The grantee is not a co-owner of other servitudes
granted by other co-owners. Nor is he a co-owner with the other landowner; rather he
owns a separate and distinct right. Thus, he is neither required to give consent nor allowed
to prevent a co-owner from acting. Consent is reserved to the co-owners and does not
extend to the grantees of other rights in the property. See La. R.S. 31:169 (1975).
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In other words, if the servitude is granted for ten years, A gives his
consent to mineral development for only ten years, or until production
obtained under this servitude ceases. By granting the servitude, A allows
B, his co-owner, to consent to X. This should allow B or his grantee
to also conduct operations, since A could not prevent B or B's grantee
from acting if they joined efforts with X. Therefore, A should not be
allowed to prevent either B or his grantee from acting alone.
There is a problem with this middle ground solution. If B has
granted a mineral right to Y which expires later than X's servitude, Y
would be prevented from the exercise of his full right unless A consented
to his activities upon the expiration of X's servitude. A would be under
no obligation to extend his consent to Y, since his prior consent was
subject to a term which had expired. This would be so even if Y had
obtained production and was currently producing minerals at the time
consent expired. Y could be forced to suspend operations, at great
expense and loss of profits, while A could use the situation to obtain
greater royalties and lease bonuses.
The problem resolves itself if the consent amounts to consent to
the activity, thereby constituting consent to a change in the destination
of the property. Such consent is not for a term, but lasts until all of
the co-owners determine that mineral development should no longer be
permitted, 2" because, by granting the mineral right, the co-owner implies
his consent to mineral operations on the land. 28 This consent extends
to the other co-owner as well as the grantor's grantee. Since a co-owner
does not own a discrete, distinguishable part of the land, but instead
owns an undivided portion jointly with another, he would necessarily
be implying, by consent to his grantee, that he also would permit his
co-owner to grant operations. Thus, once B grants a right to conduct
operations as to his share, even if granted to a grantee other than A's,
he would also be giving consent to A and A's grantee. Each is expressing
his desire to develop minerals and should not be able to object to
development by the other's grantee. Similarly, each grantee should be
able to operate without obtaining additional consent, based on each co-
owner's individual consent given to another grantee. 29
Neither grantee would be allowed to object to the other's operations
on the land. As the co-owner could not convey a greater right than he
had, each grantee, whether he obtained a servitude or lease, has a non-
27. Neither the mineral code nor interpreting jurisprudence has addressed the issue
of whether all co-owners must consent, or whether 90076 will suffice, to cease mineral
development.
28. Harrell, The Mineral Code After a Year, Where Are the Problem Areas?, 23
Min. L. Inst. 93, 103 (1976).
29. Harrell, supra note 24, at 427-28.
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exclusive right. Therefore, since the interest is non-exclusive, the grantee
does not obtain the right to object to another who has also been granted
a non-exclusive right to develop the land. Once a mineral right is granted,
neither the granting co-owner nor the grantee can object to another's
mineral activities on the land if this person holds a valid mineral right.
One can argue, however, that a co-owner who consents should be
free to change his mind as to the development of minerals on his own
land at any time. If both co-owners join to grant a mineral right which
expires after ten years non-use, it can be argued that each now should
be free to decide that no operations should be conducted, and that new
consent must be obtained before a new servitude could be granted. This
right to control the use of one's own property is inherent in our scheme
of ownership.30 At the same time, mineral exploitation is an on-going
activity. To permit a unilateral change after consenting to the activity
deprives another co-owner of his ability to continue to use property for
purposes to which all co-owners previously consented. Once the parties
have agreed to develop minerals, the destination of the property now
includes such development. A co-owner may exercise his rights on the
whole property in order to receive the returns to which he is entitled,
but he is only allowed to retain his proportion of the profits.3' As
pointed out previously, the contrary rule may deny to a co-owner the
opportunity to develop minerals if the rights granted expire at different
time periods. Therefore, a determination that consent is given to the
activity of mineral development provides the most equitable results.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE-PREVENTION OF WASTE OR DESTRUCTION
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized one situation in which
consent is not required by a co-owner to conduct mineral operations.
In United Gas Public Service Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co. ,32
a plaintiff brought suit to enjoin mineral operations by the defendant.
The plaintiff claimed he was a co-owner and, as such, was entitled to
prevent operations to which he did not consent. The defendant denied
that the plaintiff was a co-owner and alleged that he was being injured
because the plaintiff was draining gas beneath his property from gas
wells located on the plaintiff's adjacent lands. The court found that the
30. Civil Code art. 477 provides that "[ownership is the right that confers on a
person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing
may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established
by law." La. Civ. Code art. 477.
31. Stinson v. Marston, 185 La. 365, 169 So. 436 (1936); Moreira v. Schwan, 113
La. 643, 37 So. 542 (1904); Heirs of Balfour v. Balfour, 33 La. Ann. 297 (1881); Smith
v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255 (1855).
32. 176 La. 1024, 147 So. 66 (1933).
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tract in question had no value other than mineral production and that
it was within a proven gas field. The court refused to issue the injunction
because the plaintiff's drainage destroyed the only value of the land,
the plaintiff's claim of co-ownership was denied by the defendant, and
the defendant was only acting to preserve the value of the land by
preventing drainage. Therefore, the defendant's actions were not inju-
rious to a co-owner's rights.
Subsequent jurisprudence has indicated that this exception to the
requirement of consent by co-owners is a very limited one. The only
case to consider the matter since United Gas refused to allow one co-
owner to operate without consent where he failed to show that he would
suffer irreparable injury even though there appeared to be no other use
for the land than mineral development.33
Despite the jurisprudential requirement of proof of irreparable injury
before a co-owner may act without consent, the mineral code provides
in article 176 that a co-owner of a servitude "may act to prevent waste
or the destruction or extinction of the servitude, but he cannot impose
upon his co-owner liability for any costs of development or operation
or other costs except out of production. 3 4 The article further provides
that in doing so he must act in good faith at all times, and allows him
to act as to the entire interest, not just his proportionate share.
The mineral code makes no attempt to define the terms "waste"
or "destruction" in article 176 and thus leaves much discretion with
the courts. Many instances may arise in which one co-owner must act
alone in order to preserve the existence of the servitude, such as in
disputes regarding drilling exploratory wells or additional wells for de-
velopment of leased property, or in developing multiple completions of
wells.3 5 Article 176 accords with prior jurisprudence which allowed a
co-owner to act to prevent drainage.
The mineral code only provides for action by co-owners of servitudes,
but seems to be an extension of United Gas which applied to co-owners
of land. The comments to article 176 indicate that the redactors construed
United Gas as generally allowing development by a co-owner of land
without consent of the other co-owner when he was acting to prevent
waste.36 Therefore, this article can be used to support application of
the principle to co-owners of land as well.
33. Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 246 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), aff'd on other
grounds, 261 La. 502, 260 So. 2d 307 (1972).
34. La. R.S. 31:176 (1975).
35. McLaughlin, Co-ownership and Partition of Mineral Rights in Louisiana, 27 Min.
L. Inst. 135 (1980).
36. La. R.S. 31:176 (1975), official comments.
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CONSENT BETWEEN CO-OWNERS OF SERVITUDES AND OF LEASES
Servitudes
The mineral code applies the same requirement of consent to co-
owners of mineral servitudes as it does to co-owners of land. Article
175 provides that a co-owner of a mineral servitude must obtain consent
of co-owners owning at least an undivided ninety percent interest in the
servitude in order to conduct operations. Because of the inherently
exploitive nature of a mineral servitude, however, this provision does
not seem to be consistent with the purpose for which consent is deemed
necessary, which is to prevent one co-owner from imposing his desires
as to the use of the land when such a use would constitute a change
in the destination of the land.
The interests of co-owners of a servitude are distinguishable from
the interests held by co-owners of land. The very nature of a mineral
servitude is the right to explore for and produce minerals and reduce
them to possession and ownership.3 7 While the mineral servitude owner
is under no obligation to exercise this right,3" the power to do so is
inherent in the very right. The servitude owners acquire the servitude
purportedly to develop minerals, for this is its only value. There would
seem to be an implicit agreement between the servitude owners, providing
consent to the development of minerals, by the very act of acquiring
the servitude. Therefore, there would not be a change in the destination
of the land as this use was determined by the parties upon acquisition
of the mineral right.3 9
It would appear more logical and equitable to permit a co-owner
of a mineral interest to act alone to obtain mineral development. This
would be more in line with neighboring states.40 The courts have held
that once a use of the land has been determined, one co-owner may
use the whole property for that purpose to which it is destined and
receive the returns to which he is entitled .4 Nevertheless, even if the
37. Article 31 provides that "[a] mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land
belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing
them to possession and ownership." La. R.S. 31:21 (1975).
38. Article 22 provides that "[tlhe owner of a mineral servitude is under no obligation
to exercise it." La. R.S. 31:22 (1975).
39. Harrell, supra note 24, at 409.
40. See supra notes 14 and 15.
41. Stinson v. Marston, 185 La. 365, 169 So. 436 (1936).
[Vol. 48
COMMENT
co-owner acts alone, he may be allowed only to retain his share of the
proceeds, and must account to the other co-owners. 42
It would at least appear that the parties who acquire a servitude
must contemplate the eventual development of minerals and should not
be allowed to obstruct the very purpose for which the grant is obtained.
Withholding consent could be detrimental to the co-owning servitude
holder desiring development, as the right may be lost through prescrip-
tion. This co-owner of the servitude would be deprived of the total
value of his right if it cannot be exercised. A servitude co-owner who
does not wish to participate, perhaps for financial reasons, is still pro-
tected. He is not personally liable for the cost of the operations, except
that, in the event of production, his share of the costs may be withheld
from his share of the proceeds from production. This is consistent with
mineral code article 22, which provides that a servitude owner is not
obligated to exercise the servitude, and is also fair to the co-owner
whose right could be useless because of the whim of another whom he
cannot control. It may be that the developing co-owner will not want
to accept all the risk while only being able to retain a proportion of
the proceeds; nevertheless, he is not denied the exercise of his right and
the choice to proceed is entirely his own.43
A distinction also exists between the co-owner who merely consents
to mineral development and the co-owner who agrees to participate in
the venture. The one who only gives his consent is not held personally
liable for the costs of the operation; however, in the event of production,
costs may be withheld out of his production proceeds." Similarly, he is
entitled to his share of the proceeds if the operations are successful, as
the operating co-owner is only allowed to retain his proportionate share
and no more. If the operations prove unsuccessful, a co-owner who
agrees to participate will be held liable for costs in accordance with his
agreement .4  Thus, the co-owner who is no longer willing to participate
42. Huckaby v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So. 2d 829 (1955); Starr Davis Oil Co.
v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950); Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172
La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931). These cases involved owners of fractional mineral interests;
however, the same rule of accounting has been applied to co-owners.
43. The projet to the mineral code allowed servitude owners to operate independently
of each other, without the requirement of consent. There was no distinction as to consent
between co-owners of a servitude and fractional mineral interest owners, which seems to
be the proper conclusion. See Harrell, supra note 24, at 440. However, by requiring
consent among co-owners, the code places a burden on them merely because they acquired
their rights at the same time, whereas fractional mineral interest owners own a portion
of the interest but are not co-owners because they acquired their rights at different times.
44. La. R.S. 31:177 (1975); Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 152 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1963).
45. Harrell, supra note 24, at 406-07.
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may consent and still be protected from financial risk. This allows the
other co-owner to pursue his interests with no harm to the co-owner
who merely consents, yet allows the consenting co-owner to share in
the proceeds after the costs are withheld in the event of successful
operations.
Leases
Co-owners of a mineral lease are also required to obtain the consent
of other co-owners, pursuant to article 177.46 The legislation amending
the code to require ninety percent of the co-owned interest did not
extend to co-owners of mineral leases; thus unanimous consent is still
required.
The comments to article 173 provide insight into the purpose of
consent between lessees. The redactors stated that consent was required
because "leases are taken in contemplation of development, and to
permit one co-owner to make a business decision which binds or has
an effect on the value of the interest of the other co-owner is unwise."
47
A lessee, however, is contractually bound to develop the lease. 48 If he
must obtain consent from his co-owner he may be placed in a position
where he cannot validly exercise the lease and will not be able to fulfill
the contract. Co-owners of leases, however, may seek the remedy of
partition if unresolvable problems arise. 49 It can be argued that this
remedy of partition would also be the appropriate remedy for the
servitude owner whose co-owner has refused to give consent.5 0
THE "REMEDY" OF PARTITION
Partitions can prove to be a very unfair remedy for the co-owner
who desires development. The courts overwhelmingly have held that
mineral interests cannot be divided in kind and must be divided by
46. Article 177 provides that "[a] co-owner of the lessee's interest in a mineral lease
may not independently conduct operations, or, except as provided in this article and
Article 171, deal with the interest without the consent of his co-owner." La. R.S. 31:177
(1975).
47. La. R.S. 31:173, official comments.
48. Article 122 provides that "[a] mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation
to his lessor, but is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and
operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of
himself and his lessor." La. R.S. 31:122 (1975).
49. Article 173 provides that "[co-owners of the lessee's interest in a mineral lease
may compel partition of their rights." La. R.S. 31:173 (1975).
50. Article 172 provides that "[m]ineral servitudes and royalties are subject to par-
tition." La. R.S. 31:172 (1975).
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licitation.51 Because of uncertainty about the exact location of minerals
while they are in the ground, a partition in kind would be virtually
impossible. One co-owner cannot compel another to accept ownership
of a definite area which may not contain any minerals. When equality
cannot be had by a partition in kind, partition must be by licitation;
however, such a partition deprives the co-owner of his right to develop
the minerals.
Furthermore, several other problems may arise if the co-owners must
partition by licitation. Because of the required sale of the interest, a
co-owner may be deprived of the opportunity to speculate, which might
have resulted in later development yielding higher financial benefits. An
action for partition frequently is quite expensive, and it usually takes
several years to resolve.5 2 In addition, if one co-owner is at an economic
disadvantage to the other, partition by licitation can be used by the
wealthier co-owner to deprive the disadvantaged co-owner of his interest
at a nominal cost.53 Therefore, although partition is frequently suggested,
it may not always be an appropriate remedy.
CONSENT TO ROYALTY INTERESTS AND OTHER PASSIVE RIGHTS
The mineral code differentiates the requirement of consent according
to the particular mineral interest involved. As previously stated, co-
owners of servitudes must obtain consent of co-owners holding ninety
percent interest while co-owners of leases must obtain unanimous con-
sent. There is no requirement, however, that a co-owner of land or a
co-owner of a servitude acquire the consent of his co-owner in order
to create a mineral royalty out of his undivided interest.5 4 Furthermore,
51. Sellwood v. Phillips, 185 La. 1045, 171 So. 440 (1936); Connette v. Wright, 149
La. 478, 89 So. 626 (1921); Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 138 La. 555, 70 So. 509 (1915);
Thibaut v. Thibaut, 407 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 409 So. 2d
659 (La. 1982); Patrick v. Johnstone, 361 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
364 So. 2d 600 (La. 1978).
52. McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 148.
53. It will generally be to the offeree's advantage financially to accept a low offer
and forego the cost and delay of a partition. Whether he accepts the offer or forces a
partition, the disadvantaged co-owner ends up with less than the full value of his interest.
The wealthy co-owner profits from avoiding partition costs, too, but also receives the
property at a price lower than market value and retains the potential for speculative
profits in the future. Partition of mineral rights has been widely discussed in numerous
law review and Mineral Law Institute articles; see, e.g., Gates, Partition of Land and
Mineral Rights, 43 La. L. Rev. 1119 (1983).
54. Article 165 provides that "[tihe consent of the co-owner of the party creating
the royalty right is not necessary to entitle the royalty owner to receive his proportionate
part of production." La. R.S. 31:165 (1975).
Article 170 provides that "[tihe consent of the co-owner of the party creating the
royalty is not necessary to entitle the royalty owner to receive his proportionate part of
production." La. R.S. 31:170 (1975).
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a co-owner of a lessee's interest or a co-owner of a mineral servitude
"may create a dependant right such as an overriding royalty, production
payment, net profits interest, or other non-operating interest out of his
undivided interest without the consent of his co-owner." '5 This distinction
exists because all of these rights are passive rights and do not convey
any rights of use of the land or servitude. Therefore, they do not
constitute a change in the destination of the land. The requirement that
consent be given must have already been met in order for production
to have occured. Furthermore, the granting of any of these passive rights
does not infringe on the other co-owner's interest; thus, they should
not be allowed a voice in the decisions of a co-owner as to the use of
the proceeds of his own share.
RIGHTS OF CONSENTING AND NONCONSENTING CO-OWNERS
The mineral code and the jurisprudence have both strongly favored
the nonconsenting co-owner, whether the thing held in indivision is the
land or a mineral right. This has been lessened to a small degree by
the requirement that only ninety percent consent be obtained rather than
the prior insistence upon unanimous consent by co-owners. While this
amendment does lean in favor of consenting co-owners and majority
rule, it is a small step, and in most cases one co-owner can still prevent
development of minerals.
The 1987 Regular Session of the Legislature passed House Bill 1154
which decreased the required percentage of co-owners who must consent
to mineral operations from ninety percent to seventy-five percent. This
would have been closer to the allowance of majority rule in the man-
agement of mineral interests. However, the governor vetoed this legis-
lation, stating that such a decrease is unjust to the dissenting minority
co-owners and erodes the civilian concept of ownership. 6 The governor
believed this decrease resulted in an unreasonable balance favoring the
co-owners who consented and placing those who did not at a disad-
vantage. This opinion is accurate if only the right of the nonconsenting
co-owner is considered. If he does not desire development of his share,
imposition of the other co-owners' decision on him would infringe on
his ownership rights to have absolute control over the thing.
Regardless of how the decision is made, some co-owners will be
deprived of their preference for the use when there is disagreement. The
rights of the consenting co-owners who wish to initiate mineral devel-
opment must also be considered. Presently, a small dissident minority
55. La. R.S. 31:171 (1975).
56. Veto Message from Governor Edwin Edwards to Honorable Alfred Speer, Clerk
of the House of Representatives, July 6, 1987, H.R. 1154, La. Reg. Sess (1987).
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may dictate its desires to them, depriving the consenting co-owners of
their right to develop. It is unfair to allow a small percentage, perhaps
even one person, to control the economic commitment of the majority
who holds a thing jointly.
Majority rule would be a more equitable solution. It would not
erode the civilian concept of ownership, because both sides would be
given equal opportunities to muster a majority in the determination of
the destination of the land. Furthermore, majority rule would encourage
the use of the land rather than the removal of land from commerce
that occurs because a small minority refuses to allow it to be put to
the more profitable use. The minority would retain its protections be-
cause, if they refused to participate, they would only be subject to costs
withheld from their production proceeds in the event of production.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Co-ownership laws in Louisiana require consent of owners holding
a ninety percent interest in land or a mineral servitude before mineral
development can be undertaken. Such a strict requirement can prove to
be quite harsh to those who hold mineral interests which have no other
value than that which results from development of the minerals. It also
operates to keep valuable land out of commerce due to the refusal of
even a small minority to undergo mineral development. This result is
attributable to civil law concepts which hold that each co-owner owns
a portion of "each molecule" of the property held in common. Louisiana
law favors holding the land in a state of status quo unless those rep-
resenting ninety percent of the ownership interest can agree to a change,
so as not to infringe on any of the co-owner's absolute rights of dominion
over the land he owns.
The requirement of consent, however, can also operate to deprive
co-owners of the absolute right over the thing should they choose to
undergo mineral development. A small minority can block development,
even though the land has no value other than mineral development.
Furthermore, once consent has been given, it should be considered a
change in the destination of the land. Such a conclusion would allow
a co-owner who desires development to proceed with relative assurance
that he will be able to complete his investment without the possibility
of subsequent action halting development of the minerals.
In recent years there has been limited success in adopting a more
equitable solution concerning disagreement among co-owners. The 1986
Louisiana legislature authorized the requirement of only ninety percent
consent among co-owners, rejecting the long-held requirement of unan-
imous consent of co-owners in order to change the destination of the
property for mineral development.
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Presently, the code unnecessarily maintains a uniform rule as to co-
owners of land and co-owners of mineral interests. There are different
considerations to be applied in these situations which should allow a
distinction between the consent needed for development. Some co-owners
of land may want to put the land to use in ways which would be
incompatible with mineral development. These non-mineral considera-
tions make it logical that at least a majority of the owners should
determine the manner in which the land is utilized. Any co-owner would
be hard-pressed to prove his use is better or more advantageous than
those of the others. Therefore, consent of at least a majority of the
co-owners of land is a desirable requirement.
Those considerations are not present in co-owned mineral interests.
Furthermore, the requirement of consent distinguishes co-owners of min-
eral interests from fractional mineral interest owners for no apparent
reason. The difference between these two interests is the manner by
which the interests are created-co-owners each receive their interests in
one juridical act,57 while owners of fractional mineral servitudes obtain
their interests each at different times or in different acts." Since their
interests are essentially the same, to require co-owners of the mineral
interests to obtain consent while allowing fractional mineral interest
owners to act independently does not seem consistent. Majority rule
should certainly be permitted for co-owners of mineral interests as
mineral development is contemplated by the mere acquisition of the
right. A co-owner should not be disadvantaged by another co-owner
withholding consent when the activity has already been determined by
obtaining the mineral right.
A requirement of majority rule among co-owners would not erode
the civilian concept of ownership, as it would still allow for all co-
owners to have a voice in the determination of the use of the property
held in common. Such a rule will not allow one co-owner to determine
the destination of the property just as it will not allow one co-owner
or a small minority to prevent a beneficial use of the jointly-owned
property. Each side may express its desires as to the destination of the
property, with majority ruling, as is the case in our democratic society.
In this light, a further reduction in the requirement of consent should
prove to develop a more equitable system.
Angela Jeanne Crowder
57. La. R.S. 31:63 (1975).
58. If A and B each separately acquire a mineral servitude for one-half of the minerals
from a landowner, they are not co-owners. Each can develop independent of and without
the consent of the other.
[Vol. 48
